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Abstract:  
The Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill will introduce criminal 
penalties for price fixing and other cartel offences.  This law change has faced commentary 
and critique  from several perspectives including competition law, economics, criminal law 
and its practical effect on business.  My paper will examine the criminalisation of cartels 
through a regulatory lens, starting from the premise that criminal law can be subsumed 
under the regulatory paradigm.  I will identify the regulatory problem that price fixing 
cartels pose, explore the Bill’s practical implications and then provide a flavour of the debate 
around whether such change is appropriate or desirable.  Finally, I will draw my own 
conclusions regarding the Bill and its overall desirability, as well as criminalisation as a 
regulatory response. 
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 Introduction 
“… I heard my colleague say earlier, that the intent of the bill is good. A hard-
working Minister brought it into the House, but this Government has been 
very slow to move it through because of its distaste, it seems, for the measures 
in the bill. Right now Government members are under pressure. They are 
under a lot of pressure to make it look like they are interested in regulating 
the market appropriately (emphasis added) and so they are putting this bill 
through this evening.” 1 
Dr David Clark MP describes the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 
(“the Bill”), as an attempt by the Government to appear to be regulating the market 
appropriately. 2   I suggest that the Bill is actually more concerned with regulating the market 
effectively, at least in terms of cartels, which is a different proposition. In this context 
regulating refers to the protection of market integrity through anti-cartel measures.  The 
Commerce Act 1986 (the “Act”) currently regulates the market in this respect, through a 
pecuniary penalty scheme.3  However, there is a school of thought which believes that criminal 
penalties are a more effective means of both deterring cartelists, and enhancing the methods 
by which they are exposed. 4  This point of view has been widely accepted, at least by 
governments, and is reflected in the global trend towards cartel criminalisation.  Legislation, 
which imposes criminal penalties for cartel conduct, has already been passed in the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom and most recently Australia.5    Although many state 
actors appear to see such laws as desirable, whether they actually are is debatable. 
This debate is usually approached from competition law, criminal law and economics 
perspectives.  However, I suggest that the issue can also be looked at through a regulatory lens.  
I see the discussion as chiefly concerning a choice of approaches to a regulatory problem.  As 
a regulatory instrument, the Bill is concerned with the introduction of new measures designed 
                                                          
1 (26 November 2014) 702 NZPD 888; Second reading of the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) 
Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2).  
2 Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2).   
3 Commerce Act 1986, ss 27,30,80. 
4 Those discussed in this paper include Wouter J Wils  “ Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the 
Answer? “ (2005)  28(2) World Competition 117; Terry Calvani “Cartel Sanctions and deterrence” (2011) 56 
Antitrust Bull. 185; Peter Whelan “Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of ‘Moral Wrongfulness” (2013) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; Caron Beaton-Wells “Capturing the Criminality of Hard Core Cartels: the 
Australian Proposal “(2007) 31 Melb. U. L. Rev. 675.  
5  Ministry of Economic Development Cartel Criminalisation Discussion Document January 2010 (see the 
forward by then Minister of Commerce, Simon Power MP);  Sherman Act  15 USC  §1 ; Competition Act RSC 
1985 c. C-34,  s  45 ; Enterprise Act 2002, s 188 (UK);  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s 45 (Cth). 
Regulating For “Well-Dressed Thieves”: Criminalisation As A Regulatory Response To Price Fixing Cartels 
 
 
5 
 
to deter non-compliance with accepted norms of competitive business practice.   My  paper 
will explore the Bill, and price fixing cartels, as a context for the discussion of criminalisation 
as a regulatory response. 
The Bill appears to have three very clear objectives.6   First criminal penalties, with their 
accompanying stigma and potential deprivation of liberty, would enhance the deterrence of 
cartel conduct. Second, the detection of cartels would also be improved as the Commerce 
Commission’s leniency scheme would have greater appeal (owing to the possibility of 
executives facing imprisonment). Third, the change would allow New Zealand to cooperate 
more effectively in international efforts to combat cartels, as many comparable jurisdictions 
including the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia have already criminalised 
such conduct.    While these may look like separate goals for the legislative change I suggest 
that they are actually sub-goals which contribute to the overall regulatory goal: the maintenance 
of the market’s competitive integrity through the prevention of market failure arising from the 
activities of cartels.  The real question is then whether these sub-goals will be actually be 
furthered by criminalisation, and in turn further the comprehensive regulatory objective. 
The question of whether it is desirable to adopt criminal penalties for price fixing is not a new 
one. Criminal penalties have been available in the United States after the passing of the 
Sherman Act in 1890 and have been applied since the 1950’s. 7  A cursory look at my 
bibliography will show that highly regarded scholars have given the issue serious 
consideration.   Similarly I have included opposing viewpoints from submissions on the Bill, 
from businesspeople and legal practitioners.   
My paper will be divided into four parts.  Part one will explore criminal and regulatory law and 
their prima facie differences.  This section will include some broad definitions, as well as 
comments from criminal thinkers and jurists on the nature of regulation. I will then discuss 
those purported distinctions and how I believe criminal law can be subsumed under the 
regulatory paradigm. 
Part two will examine the regulatory problem that cartels pose. First I will identify precisely 
what is meant by cartel.  Next I turn to the concepts of harm and wrong, from a criminal 
                                                          
6 (24 July 2012)   682  NZPD 3869; these goals were stated in the first reading speech, by Craig Foss MP, then 
Minister of Commerce. 
7  Sherman Act  15 USC  §1  provides for punishment of restrictive trade practices as a felony, punishable by 
fines not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if a person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years, or by both. 
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perspective, and explore how cartels perpetrate harm in a regulatory sense: as a form of market 
failure.   This section will provide some context by including examples of cartel cases, both in 
New Zealand and overseas. It will also involve a discussion of why cartel conduct can be 
conceptualized as crime by drawing a direct analogy between cartels and theft. 
Part three will explore the Bill itself. I will start with the current legislative response to cartels, 
as well as the role of the Commerce Commission in cartel prosecutions.   Next I will turn to 
the provisions of the Bill itself, which relate to an attempt to clarify the law and introduce 
criminal penalties for cartelists.  This will include a discussion of the procedural and evidential 
implications that will arise from criminalisation. 
Part four will deal with the debate around criminalisation, beginning with some of the major 
themes of opposition to criminalisation that have emerged.  Next I will deal with the two main 
justifications for criminalisation: deterrence and the enhancement of leniency programmes. I 
will provide some insights on the perceived difficulty with pecuniary penalties (whether 
applied to individuals or corporations) and arguments for the inherently superior deterrent 
effect of imprisonment.   I will end this part with some suggestions regarding possible 
alternatives to criminalisation.    Finally, I will draw some conclusions regarding 
criminalisation as a regulatory response and make a summative comment on the desirability of 
the Bill as a response to cartels. 
Three important clarifications are necessary before I proceed.  First, I will only be discussing 
cartel conduct within the context of price fixing.  This is not to suggest that other types of cartel 
activities e.g. bid-rigging, output restriction and market allocation, are not as harmful as price 
fixing.8   However, confining the scope of my discussion to price fixing seems appropriate as 
it is often the most sensationalized of the restrictive trade practices, and there certainly is a 
sensational element to the debate regarding whether or not such conduct should be punishable 
by jail time. 
Secondly, for the avoidance of doubt, when “criminal penalties” are referred to this can be 
taken to be synonymous with imprisonment.  Third, this Bill raises a wide array of issues and 
there is only so much scope to cover them in this paper. As such, my regulatory focus is rather 
narrow and I am leaving aside serious discussion of some of the other concerns raised about 
                                                          
8  Market-allocation, for example allows firms to act as though they were monopolists within their allocated 
territories; Lindsay Hampton and Paul G Scott Guide to Competition Law (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2013) at 
164. 
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the Bill.  There simply is not space to properly explore the issues that have been raised with 
regards to the Bill’s effect on shipping, extra-territorial jurisdiction, the clearance regime or the 
capture of procompetitive/efficiency enhancing activity - each of which is worthy of a paper in 
its own right.  
 
I Criminal vs Regulatory law 
A. Initial assumptions 
My initial view was that, although they shared some common elements, criminal law and 
regulatory law were distinct entities. From this perspective criminalisation represented a 
paradigm shift in the way in New Zealand responds to cartels. What was essentially a regulatory 
offence was being transformed into a crime.  
This criminal/regulatory divide conforms to that of criminal law theorists, such as Asworth  
and Simester.  These scholars view regulatory offences and so-called true crime as clearly 
distinguishable on the basis of their respective mens rea, or lack thereof.9   Criminal offences 
require varying   degrees of intention, from the actual intention to do a harmful act to criminal 
recklessness (intentional running of an unreasonable risk). 10  The more stringent fault 
standards ,for  criminal offences, are justified on the basis of the more severe social stigma and 
penalties that generally follow with criminal liability. 11 
Regulatory offences are those which criminal theorists would characterize as lacking a mental 
fault requirement.12  Usefully,  regulatory offences have been categorized as either strict or 
absolute liability. 13   For an absolute liability offence a prosecutor is only required to show 
that the defendant committed the unlawful act, and liability follows. 14   For strict liability 
offences the prosecution’s task still only extends to proof of the act, but an offender may 
exonerate themselves by establishing an absence of fault.15 These workable distinctions were 
                                                          
9 AP Simester and GR Sullivan  Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine ( 3rd ed, Hart Publishing,  Portland, Oregon, 
2007) at  165 ; Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law  (6th ed , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 
at  163. 
10 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, above n 9, at 119. 
11 At 180.  
12 Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, at 160. 
13 At 160;  There are many examples of strict liability offences under New Zealand law, e.g.  Biosecurity Act 
1993, ss 154N, Animal Welfare Act 1999, s 25, Resource Management Act 1991 ss 11, 341   Freedom Camping 
Act 2011, ss 20-21.  
14 Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, at 185.  
15 Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, at 185; R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. 
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set out in R v Sault Ste. Marie (City) (“Sault Ste. Marie”) by the Canadian Supreme Court, and 
were adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Civil Aviation Department v 
MacKenzie. 16  While Asworth, Simester  and the Judges in Sault Ste. Marie might  say that  
lack of a mental fault element makes criminal law distinct from regulatory law I submit that 
rather it makes criminal law distinct within the paradigm of regulatory law – an argument I will 
develop below. 
Perhaps the type of conduct that criminal and regulatory offences deal with might provide a 
more meaningful distinction than mental fault requirements.  In Sault Ste. Marie the Court 
characterized regulatory or public welfare offences as those which emphasized the protection 
of social and public interests rather than individual ones, in the words of Dickson J “everyday 
matters”.18 While the criminal law is often perceived as dealing with serious offending 
regulatory law appears to perform a maintenance function – in that it keeps the minutiae of 
everyday life in order.  In the words of Cory J in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc:  19 
From cradle to grave, we are protected by regulations; they apply to the doctors attending 
our entry into this world and to the morticians present at our departure. Every day, from 
waking to sleeping, we profit from regulatory measures which we often take for granted. 
On rising, we use various forms of energy whose safe distribution and use are governed by 
regulation. The trains, buses and other vehicles that get us to work are regulated for our 
safety. The food we eat and the beverages we drink are subject to regulation for the 
protection of our health. 
In short, regulation is absolutely essential for our protection and well-being as individuals, 
and for the effective functioning of society. 
It also seems to follow that as regulatory offences deal with everyday matters, contrasted with 
the more serious anti-social behaviour associated with criminal law, they attract less serious 
penalties.  Perhaps this is why, when asked, most lawyers would probably suggest that the 
difference between a criminal and regulatory offence is the difference between imprisonment 
and a fine.   
There are other distinctions, which appear to set criminal and regulatory law apart.  These 
include both conceptual and practical differences. Conceptually, criminal law appears to have 
specific moral normative aspects and is based on the principles of harm and wrong. Practically, 
there are marked differences between the rules of criminal procedure and those involved in 
                                                          
16 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299; Civil Aviation Department v MacKenzie [1983] NZLR 98.  
18 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), above n 16.  
19 R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154,  in  Rick Libman  Sentencing Purposes and 
Principles for Provincial Offences ( LCO SP June 2010) at 12. 
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civil proceedings for regulatory offences, as well as clear differences between the types of 
punishments available. 20 I will touch only briefly on such distinctions here, as I will be 
addressing some of the procedural specifics of criminal law when I discuss criminalisation’s 
implications for cartel prosecutions in Part two of this paper.  For now, it is important to note 
that the key characteristics of a criminal prosecution include higher levels of scrutiny and proof. 
These reflect that criminal punishments, which often include imprisonment, are perceived to 
be more severe than civil pecuniary penalties – both in their direct effect on the offender, and 
in terms of societal stigma.  This higher level of punishment is balanced by a higher level of 
protection for defendants, via tighter procedural controls.21  As a result, the burden of proof in 
criminal trials is significantly higher and the rules of evidence are more stringent. 
In summary, if we accept these purported distinctions then a visual representation of the divide 
between criminal and regulatory law might look like this:  
 
 
 
 
 
B. Criminal law within the regulatory paradigm 
While the courts and theorists seem to classify crime and regulatory offending separately 
based on mental fault, subject matter and punishment I submit that these distinctions are   
unsatisfactory.  One does not need to go far to find areas of overlap.    With respect to mental 
fault, price fixing, which could currently be described as a regulatory offence, must by 
definition involve a conspiracy the sine qua non of which is a mental fault element i.e. an 
agreement to commit an offence.22  In terms of everyday matters, the criminal law deals with 
aberrant conduct, such as murder, but also with offending as mundane as traffic offences.23   
                                                          
20 Simester and Sullivan,  Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, 581. 
21 Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law, above n 9, at 2-4.  
22 Commerce Act 1986 ss 27,30.  
23 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 7, 35. 
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Clarke suggests that criminal laws are not restricted to dealing with violent or directly harmful 
conduct, but are a convenient tool for the deterrence and punishment of anti-social conduct, 
some of which is no worse than perceived civil wrongs.24   
In terms of consequences, the simple jail vs. fine demarcation does not always form a 
consistent division between so-called crimes and regulatory offences.  For, certain offences, 
which would generally be perceived as regulatory, are punishable by incarceration while 
Category One criminal offences, by definition, are only punishable by fines. 25 
Clearly, the purported distinctions break down under close scrutiny. Perhaps then a more 
meaningful inquiry will be into the definitions of criminal and regulatory law and what those 
definitions reveal about their purpose.  
Regulation is a difficult term to pin down and scholars have suggested that regulation is a 
comprehensive term which defies simple definitions. 26 The New Zealand Law Commission 
(the “Law Commission”) also identified the difficulty posed by the term “regulation” and the 
breadth of the conduct it can capture.   The Law Commission felt that regulation could be 
narrow, referring to standards and enforcement protocols for a small class of actors in a 
regulated activity, or wide, including general rules to control the conduct of the entire 
population. 27  Interestingly the Law Commission expressly included the Commerce Act 1986, 
with which this paper is concerned, within this range.28 
The Commission suggested that regulation could include: 29 
B. the promulgation of rules by government, accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring 
and 
C. enforcement, usually assumed to be performed through a specialist public agency; 
D. any form of direct State intervention in the economy, whatever form that intervention 
might  take; and 
                                                          
24 Julie Clarke “The increasing criminalization of economic law – a competition law perspective", 
(2011) 19(1) Journal of Financial Crime 76  at 83. 
25 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 11, 339, 341 (contravention of s 338 is punishable by up to 2 years 
imprisonment). Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 6(1)(a)  (Category One offences are expressly defined as 
offences which are not punishable by imprisonment).  
26 Bronwyn Morgan and Karen Yeung  An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007)  at 4 ; Robert Baldwin Colin Scott Christopher Hood (ed) A reader on Regulation  (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1998) at 2. 
27 Law Commission  Pecuniary Penalties (NZLC R 133, 2014) at 42-43.  
28 At 43.  
29 At 43. 
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E. all mechanisms of social control or influence affecting all aspects of behaviour from 
whatever source, whether they are intentional or not. (emphasis added) 
 
The final point is particularly useful, because it takes such a wide view of regulation - a 
purposive view.  Weatherill suggests that if we conceptualize regulation in a comprehensive 
way, it includes any measure that exerts influence over conduct irrespective of its form or 
intent.30  Similarly, Morgan and Yeung describe the broad notion of regulation as including 
any system of social oversight.31  Taking this broad view of regulation, its purpose can be 
summed up in a single word: control. In this sense regulatory law, just like criminal law, is 
essentially normative.  
 
Much like regulation, criminal law is also difficult to define. Ashworth described the criminal 
law chiefly in terms of its function and purpose, because its definition and purpose are 
inextricably entwined. 
Simester outlines
32 To Ashworth the criminal law is a standing disincentive to crime and 
reinforcement of social conventions and inhibitions.33 Glanville Williams described criminal 
law in terms of being concerned with the punishment of wrongdoers.34  the 
function of the criminal law to identify behaviours in terms of “things that must not be done” 
and the law itself as an instrument that “bullies citizens into complying with its injunctions.”36 
Such intervention into the population’s lives is justified by the prevention of harm.37  It appears 
then that the coercion of compliance by threat, is a common feature of both regulation  and 
criminal law e.g. the aforementioned penalty provisions statutes such as of the Resource 
Management Act. 
 
It is clear that the purpose of criminal law, like regulation, concerns control. It operates to deter 
anti-social conduct via the threat of fines, deprivation of liberty - and in certain jurisdictions, 
death.38  If regulation is defined as systems of control, it then becomes clear why criminal law 
falls under the regulatory paradigm.   In Morgan and Yeung’s analysis of regulatory modalities, 
                                                          
30 Stephen Weatherill  “The Challenge of Better Regulation “ ed  Better Regulation  (Hart Publishing, Oregon,  
2007) at 1.  
31 Morgan and Yeung,  An Introduction to Law and Regulation,  above n 26, at 4.  
32 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, above n 9, at 16. 
33 At 16. 
34 Dennis J Baker  Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012) at 
25- 26.  
36 Simester and Sullivan,  Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, at 5.  
37 At 582.  
38 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, above n 9, at 17. 
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criminal law generally conforms to the conception of “Command.”39  Since both criminal law 
and so-called regulatory law have the same purpose, and regulation is a comprehensive term, 
it follows then that criminal law can be subsumed within the regulatory paradigm. 
My earlier Venn diagram represented criminal law as distinct from, but overlapping with, 
regulatory law.  However, I believe that this initial view was incorrect. Instead, a more accurate 
visual representation would be something like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I suggest that my model is congruous with Hancher and Moran’s conception of regulatory 
space.40  For, if regulatory space is defined by issues it pertains to and the actors and subjects 
within it, then criminal law can be seen as  occupying the space involving both direct and 
indirect (e.g. via property, in a case of burglary) human interactions which involve certain types 
of harm.41  Within that space it seeks to influence conduct, chiefly in the form of deterrence. 
While criminal law occupies a distinct regulatory space it intersects with the regulatory spaces 
occupied by other areas of law when criminal processes and penalties are applied in those other 
fields.42    
                                                          
39 Morgan and Yeung,  An Introduction to Law and Regulation,  above n 26,  at 80.  
40 L Hancher and M Moran “Organising Regulatory Space” A reader on Regulation  Robert Baldwin Colin Scott 
and Christopher Hood (eds)  (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) at 153. 
41  At 155. 
42 NOTE:  If /when the Bill passes into law, then I will need to amend the diagram so that imprisonment also 
appears within the Competition law scheme. 
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The New Zealand Treasury has described regulatory instruments as the tools available for 
government institutions to apply, including legislation.43  In this sense I suggest that it is 
appropriate to think of the different fields of law as regulatory instruments. Seen in this way, 
their differences become reduced to their particular approach to different types of human and 
market interactions.  I prefer the word “approach” to instrument, particularly in reference to 
criminal law. This is because when a particular field of law is applied to a particular kind of 
undesirable conduct it brings with it a very distinct set of procedures, fault standards and 
consequences.   
The Biosecurity Act 1993 is a good example of intersection, between two regulatory 
approaches, one of them being criminal.  A criminal prosecution for contravention of s 154(15) 
the Biosecurity Act 1999 is subject to a criminal standard of proof and upon conviction carries 
a term of imprisonment of up to five years.44  In contrast a prosecution under s 16A is subject 
to a civil standard of proof and carries a pecuniary penalty of up to $ 500,000.45    While these 
distinctions exist within the same statutory regime, the aim of the Act remains the same: to 
regulate importation of plant and animal matter in such a way as to manage the introduction of 
pests.46  Although the criminal process is mechanically different from the civil process both 
are still just regulatory approaches, aimed towards achieving the same regulatory objective. 
As a final word on my diagram, I acknowledge that it only provides a rudimentary 
representation of criminal law’s intersection with other regulatory approaches. For simplicity’s 
sake I have only included three other areas of law.  However,  taking the broadest and most 
encompassing view of regulation, to be truly representative the diagram would have to be much 
larger and three dimensional   - in order to represent the myriad of ways in which criminal law 
intersects with other legal fields.  Whether such intersection, between criminal and competition 
law, is actually complimentary or an inappropriate intrusion is the true topic of this paper. 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Kevin Guerin Encouraging Quality Regulation: Theories and Tools ( New Zealand Treasury Working Paper 
03/24, September 2003) at 3.1. < http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2003/03-24>  
44 Biosecurity Act 1993, ss 154O(15), 157(2). 
45 Sections 16A, 154H, 154J. 
46 Biosecurity Act 1993, long title: “An Act to restate and reform the law relating to the exclusion, eradication, 
and effective management of pests and unwanted organisms”  
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II  The Regulatory Problem 
A.  Identifying Cartels 
Before exploring criminalisation as a regulatory response to cartels, it is necessary to look at 
the perceived regulatory problem that they pose.  Since the Bill is designed to criminalise so 
called “hard core cartels” the first question to ask is “what is a cartel?”     Harding describes 
the etymology of   the word “cartel” as complicated, given that to the ordinary person it would 
more likely raise associations with   vicious criminal organisations involved in the manufacture 
and distribution of drugs.47 Growing up in Canada in the 1980’s, and having been inadvertently 
exposed to the media’s fascination with the American “War on Drugs” this was certainly my 
experience. 
However, in this particular context cartel conduct refers to agreements between business 
competitors to limit competition by colluding to fix the price of a particular good or service.48   
Such anti-competitive agreements are designed to maximise the conspirators’ profits, often by 
limiting output.49  Doubtless this conjures up less sinister images than that of Columbia’s 
Medellin cocaine syndicate.50  Perhaps this is why, as Harding suggests, enforcement agencies 
preface the description of cartels with the words hard core.51 
However the hard core  label serves more than just sensationalist purposes.  A hard core cartel 
can be differentiated from a soft core cartel with regards to its harmful effects.  Soft core cartels 
involve collusion between competitors to increase profits, but without resulting in any 
distributive or deadweight losses or where those losses are offset by other benefits.52  King 
gives the example of competitors sharing transport systems to reduce costs, thereby increasing 
profits, but then allowing for lower prices of service to consumers. 53        Such collusive 
conduct, while prima facie illegal, would likely qualify for an authorisation under the Act.54 
                                                          
47 Christopher Harding “Business collusion as a criminological phenomenon: exploring the global 
criminalisation of business cartels” (2006)   14 Critical Criminology 181 at 183. 
48   Christine Parker    “The war on cartels and the social meaning of deterrence” (2013) 7 Regulation & 
Governance 174 at 174. 
49  David King Criminalisation of Cartel Behaviour (Ministry of Economic Development, Occasional Paper 
10/01,  January 2010) at  2.  
50  Andres Restrepo and Alvaro Guizado  “From smugglers to warlords: twentieth century Colombian drug “ 
(2003)  28 Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies  249.   
51  Christopher Harding,   “Business collusion as a criminological phenomenon: exploring the global 
criminalisation of business cartels” above n 47, at 183. 
 52 King Criminalisation of Cartel Behaviour, above n 49, at 4. 
53  At 4. 
54 Commerce Act 1986, ss 58 -65.  
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Similarly the OECD does not consider “hard core” agreements to include those which are: 55 
I. reasonably related to the lawful realisation of cost-reducing or output-enhancing  
efficiencies. 
 
II. are excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a Member country’s own laws, 
or 
 
III. are authorised in accordance with those laws. 
 
While such conduct is prima facie collusion, its effect is essentially procompetitive, and thus 
distinguishable from “naked restraints” targeted by cartel criminalisation theorists. 56   
 
A naked or hard-core restraint benefits the cartelists but harms consumers.  Price fixing is 
generally considered to be just such a restraint and thus a hard core cartel activity. 57  Naturally, 
it is outlawed under New Zealand law.58  Section 27 of the Act proscribes collusion between 
business competitors to enter into contracts, arrangements or understandings that have the 
effect or likely effect of substantially reducing competition in the market.  Section 30 deems 
that agreements which have the  purpose, effect or likely effect of fixing, controlling, or 
maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling, or maintaining, of the price for goods or 
services substantially lessen competition.  Thus, price fixing thus violates s 27 of the Act, via 
s 30, and is per se illegal. 59 
 
The statute appears to draw a clear line that prohibits any collusion which has the effect of 
fixing prices.    However,  much like the hard core / soft core cartel distinction the Courts have 
made similar distinctions between conduct which would amount to literal price fixing, but 
which is procompetitive and should not be penalized, and price fixing which can be 
characterized as a naked restraint and which results in harm.  This characterization approach 
emerged from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Broadcast Music Inc. v Columbia 
Broadcasting Systems. 60      The Court held that an agreement between artists and a licence-
                                                          
55 OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels OECD 1998  
at 3  <  http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2350130.pdf > . 
56 Terry Calvani “Cartel Sanctions and deterrence” (2011) 56 Antitrust Bull. 185 at 194. 
57  Hampton and Scott,  Guide to Competition Law, above n 8, at  186. 
58 Commerce Act 1986, ss 27,30 
59 Hampton and Scott,  Guide to Competition Law, above n 8, at  154.  
60 Broadcast Music Inc v Columbia Broadcasting Systems  441  US 1 (1979). 
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holder, which had the effect of literally fixing prices but was otherwise procompetitive and 
practical, would not violate the per se rule. 61 
Similar jurisprudence has also developed in Australia. In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Stereo 
FM Ltd, Lockhart J held that the literal price fixing of advertising rates, between two radio 
stations, was not price fixing for the purposes of the relevant statute.62  The position in New 
Zealand is not quite so clear.  Although Radio 2UE J was cited by Elias J in Commerce 
Commission v Caltex NZ Ltd Hampton and Scott suggest that the New Zealand Courts’ 
approach to characterization has not been clarified and remains uncertain. 63 
 
B. Cartel harms and wrongs as a regulatory problem 
Before tackling the specific harms and wrongs associated with cartel conduct, it is worthwhile 
engaging in some discussion of why any kind of conduct is deemed an offence, and thus 
becomes subject to regulation in the first place.  Ashworth and Simester would likely suggest 
that justification for conduct being proscribed turns on the harms and wrongs that it involves.64  
Ashworth suggests that harmfulness is the primary principle upon which the State can justify 
intervention into its citizens’ lives.65  The next logical question is “what is harm?”   Simester 
and Sullivan describe harm in Feinberg’s terms of the deprivation of or negative impact on an 
individual’s interests. 66  This is a useful approach to defining harm, as it encompasses the full 
spectrum of offences,  from murder ( an obvious violation of a personal interest i.e. the interest 
in being alive) to tax evasion (violation of collective welfare through unfairly shifting the tax 
burden onto other taxpayers).67   Under this paradigm offences which have a clear victim, and 
those which do not, can be also included.68 
Later in this paper I will provide arguments as to why cartels should be criminalised, based on 
their violations of moral norms and their direct analogy with theft.  However, at this stage I 
                                                          
61 Hampton and Scott,  Guide to Competition Law, above n 8, at 168; Broadcast Music Inc v Columbia 
Broadcasting Systems, above n 60.  
62 Hampton and Scott,  Guide to Competition Law, above n 8, at 166; Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Stereo FM 
Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 557,  (1982)  62 FLR  437.  
63 Commerce Commission v Caltex NZ Ltd [1998] 2 NZLR 78 (HC); Hampton and Scott,  Guide to Competition 
Law, above n 8, at 169.    
64  Simester and Sullivan,  Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, at  581;  Ashworth, Principles of 
Criminal Law, above n 9,at  28. 
65  Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, above n 9, at  27-29. 
66 Simester and Sullivan,  Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9, at  582-3. 
67 At  584-5. 
68 At  585. 
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feel it is worth examining the problem in regulatory terms. Essentially the problem is one of 
market failure: the misallocation of resources.69 From a public interest theory viewpoint, 
cartels harm the collective good by interfering with the natural allocation of resources that 
would occur in a competitive market. Clarke suggests that cartel-related harm is essentially 
distributional.70  Cartelists re-allocate wealth from their victims (consumers) by depriving them 
of the possibility of purchasing goods and services at competitive prices that would ordinarily 
exist in a free market.71   In this way cartels can also analogized with monopolies, in that they 
restrict output to a level that is sub-competitive, and by charging supra-competitive prices 
transfer income from buyers to the monopolists.72  At the same time a deadweight loss arises 
from cartels’ impact on the natural competitive process, as by distorting prices they lead to 
misallocation of consumer funds. 73     Simply put, price fixing harms consumers via increased 
prices as a result of diminished competition in a market.74 
What does this mean in practical terms?  Both Beaton-Wells and the OECD concede that 
determining precisely how much money is lost to cartels each year is impossible. 75  However, 
OECD reports indicate that the figure is in the billions of dollars and typically accounts for ten 
per cent price raises. 76     In estimating how much cartels have cost the US economy, the report 
stated that ten condemned international cartels were costing individuals and businesses 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and affected over $ 10 billion in US commerce. 77 
Furthermore, the report estimated $ 1 billion of damage in terms of overcharge and $ 1 billion 
in economic waste.    To calculate the total global harm caused by all the cartels in the world 
would require a calculation based on the above losses, plus the losses caused by those same ten 
cartels outside of the United States and then added to the losses caused by every other domestic 
and international cartel (both known and as yet undiscovered). 78 
Given the secretive nature of cartels, prosecutions for cartel conduct in New Zealand are not  
numerous.  For example, in 2014 Statistics New Zealand recorded 66 murders 58 of which 
                                                          
69 Morgan and Yeung,  An Introduction to Law and Regulation,  above n 26,  at 17. 
70 Clarke,  “The increasing criminalization of economic law – a competition law perspective", above n 24, at 78. 
71 At 78. 
72 John M Connor   Global Price Fixing   (2nd Ed, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2008) at 19.  
  < http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F3-540-34222-2 > . 
73 Clarke, “The increasing criminalization of economic law – a competition law perspective", above n 24, at 78. 
74 Hampton and Scott, Guide to Competition Law, above n 8, at 186-7.  
75  OECD Hard Core Cartels (2000 )  at 7  < http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2752129.pdf >. 
76 Caron Beaton-Wells Capturing the Criminality of Hard Core Cartels: the Australian Proposal 31 Melb. U. L. 
Rev. 675 2007 at 690. 
77 OECD Hard Core Cartels, above n 75, at 7.  
78 OECD Hard Core Cartels, above n 75, at 7.  
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were resolved, more than one per week.79  In contrast, the Regulatory Impact Statement refers 
to 17 judgments against domestic cartelists, following prosecutions by the Commerce 
Commission between 1990 and 2011.80 This amounts to approximately one per year.   
However, the relatively few prosecutions may reflect not so much a small number of cartels, 
but rather the difficulty in detecting that cartel conduct is occurring – a clear point of distinction 
with homicide. 
As an example of cartels operating within New Zealand’s jurisdiction, in 2013 the Commission 
prosecuted Visy, an Australian packaging company, for colluding with its competitor Amcor 
in both trans-Tasman market allocation and price fixing. 81   Visy settled, rather than defend 
the charge, and the company was fined $ 3.6 million while senior executive John Carroll was 
fined $ 25,000.  This prosecution followed a similar action by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (“ACCC”), who also prosecuted Visy Industries for price fixing in the 
cardboard box industry in 2007.  In finding for the ACCC, Heerey J commented that Visy’s 
activities potentially affected every Australian, because every Australian purchases items 
transported in cardboard boxes.82    Visy was fined $ 36 million, its former CEO $1.5 million 
and Mr Carroll $ 500,000 (a marked contrast to his $ 25, 000 fine in New Zealand).  This case 
also illustrates the international dimension of cartels, that an overseas-based cartel can still 
harm New Zealand consumers: in the Visy case the Commerce Commission was required to 
serve proceedings in Australia and the Court of Appeal had to first determine a protest to 
jurisdiction.83 
Large scale international cartels are capable of significant overcharges to consumers.  For 
example, the “The Global Lysine Cartel” which doubled the international price of lysine for 
three years, and was the subject of a Hollywood film.84   The five most significant lysine 
                                                          
79 Statistics New Zealand Annual Recorded Offences for the latest Calendar Years   (ANZSOC) <   
 http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE7405 > . 
80 Ministry of Economic Development  Regulatory Impact Statement: Criminalisation of Cartels ( June 2011 at)  
28-31  <http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-policy/cartel-criminalisation/ris-cartel-
criminalisation > . 
81  Commerce Commission v Visy Board Pty [2012] NZCA 383;  Fiona Rotherham  “Visy fined over Cartel 
Case” , ( 22 August 2013)   Stuff.co.nz   <http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9074146/Visy-fined-over-
cartel-case>  .  
82  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Industries Holdings Pty ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 
1617; Leonie Wood  “ Pratt headed worst cartel, says judge” The Age ( online ed, Melbourne, 3 November 
2007)  < http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/pratt-headed-worst-cartel-says-
judge/2007/11/02/1193619147550.html  > . 
83  Commerce Commission v Visy Board Pty [2012] NZCA 383 at [3].  
84 OECD Hard Core Cartels, above n 75, at 16.  The Informant” based on the eponymous book by Kurt 
Eichenwald, and starring actor Matt Damon, is a dramatization of the confessions of Lysine Cartel whistle-
blower Mark Whitacre. 
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producers colluded with a seeming disdain for consumers, one cartel member stating “our 
competitors are our friends. Our customers are the enemy.”  By raising prices by S $ 0.01 per 
pound on over US $ 1.4 billion in global sales, the cartel effectively created an overcharge of 
US $ 140 million. 85 
The harm caused by the Lysine Cartel pales in comparison to the Bulk Vitamin Cartels whose 
overcharges have been estimated between $1.1 billion (on $5.5 billion in sales) and $ 3.0 billion 
(on $ 8.4 billion in sales) the former being an overcharge of 20% and the later 36%.   Taken as 
a whole these cartels are responsible for between $ 4 and $ 9 billion in overcharges to global 
customers. 86  These examples of cartels in action illustrate how a tiny incremental harm to 
individual consumers becomes a massive collective harm when its total value is calculated. 
Even higher levels of economic harm are outlined by Connor, who refers to the total revenues 
in a market, during a price-fixing conspiracy, as “affected sales.  87  The affected sales, in 2005 
dollars, for all uncovered international cartels since 1990 total 1.4 trillion dollars. 88   The vast 
and largely unknown scope of cartel-related harm is reflected in the 1980’s US sentencing 
guidelines, which were designed with an assumed 10% overcharge.89 However, Connor 
suggests that after surveying more than 1000 price effects by cartels, the median price mark-
up is actually 25% and that 79% of cartels overcharge by more than 10%. 90  The mean 
overcharge for global cartels is generally higher than that of domestic ones, with a mean 
overcharge of 30%. 91 
In summary these examples show that, irrespective of difficulties with precise quantification 
of resource-misallocation, it is possible to infer that cartels bleed significant resources away 
from the world economy. 92 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 OECD Hard Core Cartels, above n 75, at 16.   
86 John M Connor,   Global Price Fixing, above n 72, at 8. 
87 At 8. 
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C.  Conceptualizing Cartels as Crime 
Earlier I discussed the purpose of the criminal law, and how that purpose and its focus on 
control allows it to fit under the regulatory paradigm.   It follows then that if price fixing can 
be conceptualized as crime that the criminal law is the “right tool for the job” with respect to 
dealing with cartels.  Later I will discuss why the practical problems of deterrence and 
detection give strength to arguments that price fixing should be a criminal offence.  For now, 
I will discuss three reasons why price fixing can be characterized as theft or stealing.    This is 
not a metaphorical characterization but a direct analogy to the crime of theft.  While the 
mechanics of cartels operate in a different way than a pick-pocket or safe-cracker following 
Calvani’s logic the ultimate effect is no different, although the target is not an individual or a 
bank but consumers within a market.93 
Firstly, in practical terms, price fixing fits within the conception of theft as laid out in the 
Crimes Act 1961.94  The crime of theft involves the dishonest taking of property, without a 
claim of right.   Calvani’s economic analysis of cartel-related harm allowed him to analogize 
price fixing with just such a taking, in the context of Irish law. 95   He argues that Irish 
consumers have a vested right to purchase goods at competitive prices, provided for by the 
Competition Act 2002. 96  Calvani describes this right as a proprietary interest.  Thus price 
fixers deprive them of this right by charging an inflated price and in doing so dishonestly take 
what is not theirs. 97  While a similar proprietary interest is not explicitly protected in New 
Zealand it is not difficult to see why New Zealanders, or consumers in any country, deserve 
protection from such practices. 
Secondly, the crime of theft involves the violation of a moral norm: the taking of something 
that does not belong to you is not just wrong because it is illegal, it is intrinsically immoral. As 
the methods by which cartelists allocate resources away from consumers is dissimilar to the 
methods of burglars or pick-pockets  Beaton-Wells and Whelan both described cartels as a 
                                                          
93 Terry Calvani, Member, The Competition Authority; Instructor in Law, Trinity College, Dublin.  
“Competition Penalties & Damages in a Cartel Context: Criminalisation & the Case for Custodial Sentences”   
(Presentation to the Law Society, Dublin, 13 December 2004) at 1.  <  http://www.tca.ie/EN/Promoting-
Competition/Speeches--Presentations/Terry-Calvani-Competition-Penalties--Damages-in-a-Cartel-Context.aspx >. 
94 Crimes Act 1961, s 219. 
95 Calvani “Competition Penalties & Damages in a Cartel Context: Criminalisation & the Case for Custodial 
Sentences”, above n 93, at 4.    
96 At 4. 
97 At 4. 
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form of white-collar  crime. 98 These two drew on the work of Green, in outlining the 
characteristics of so-called white-collar crime, and applied Green’s tripartite analysis of the 
moral framework of a crime:99 
1) Mens rea (or omission of mens rea) 
2) Harmfulness 
3) Moral wrongfulness 
Whelan also applied this framework to characterize cartel conduct as stealing.100 He also 
analysed the four necessary elements of theft, to show how cartels satisfy each of these 
including: 101 
1. The “thing” being stolen. In this case the purchasing power of consumers 
2. A right of ownership over the “thing” by the cartel’s victims. In this context it is the right of 
consumers to pay competitive prices. 
3. A fundamental violation.  The cartel’s a substantial interference with the right of the consumer. 
4. Wrongful Intention. That the violation is brought about by the cartelist’s intention to obtain the 
overcharge.  Interestingly, in Whelan’s conception oblique intention (a fundamental criminal 
law mens rea concept) will suffice: that the cartelist need not have the intention to cheat 
consumers, so long as they intend the offending price control. 
Green would suggest that as cartel conduct can be analogized with stealing clearly it clearly 
violates a widely held moral norm.102    Similarly, Whelan submitted to the Commerce Select 
Committee that cartels, as well as displaying negative moral content, undermine a fundamental 
economic and political philosophy of Western democracy (i.e. the free market).103 
A third justification is the strong rhetoric used by notable competition enforcement officials, 
which describes price fixing as a species of theft, and criminal in nature.   In his discussion of 
the criminality of cartels Harding cited former US Attorney-General Robert Kennedy: 104 
                                                          
98 Caron Beaton-Wells  “Capturing the Criminality of Hard Core Cartels” above n 76, at 678 ; Peter Whelan 
“Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of ‘Moral Wrongfulness’ “  (2013) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1   
at 5. 
99 Stuart Green Lying, Cheating, Stealing A moral theory of White-Collar crime ( Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2006)  at 30. 
100 Peter Whelan Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of ‘Moral Wrongfulness’,  above n 98, at 10-14. 
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102 Stuart Green Lying, Cheating, Stealing: A moral theory of White-Collar crime, above n 99, at 92.  
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We are talking about clear-cut questions of right and wrong. I view the 
businessman who engages in such conspiracies in the same light as I 
regard the racketeer who siphons off money from the public in crooked 
gambling.... A conspiracy to fix prices or rig bids is simply economic 
racketeering and the persons involved should be subject to as severe 
punishment as the courts deem appropriate .... 
Similarly when speaking in Australia Belinda Barrett, Senior Counsel for the US Department 
of Justice, cited a senate speech which described “, crimes such as price fixing… are serious 
offenses that steal from American consumers just as surely as does a street criminal with a 
gun.” 105 
Following the decision in Visy ACCC Chairman Graeme Samuel, commented that cartels are 
simply "theft, usually by well-dressed thieves."106   In describing the appropriateness of 
criminalisation Sir John Vickers, Chairman of the UK Office of Fair Trading, stated that "hard-
core cartels are like theft, criminalisation makes the punishment fit what is indeed a crime."107 
The 1998 OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard 
Core Cartels described cartels as “the most egregious violations of competition law, which 
injure consumers by raising prices resulting in goods and services becoming unavailable to 
some and unnecessarily expensive to others.” 108  Interestingly, such perceptions are not 
confined to enforcement authorities. Mark Whiteacre, the Lysine cartel whistleblower  
described price fixing as “ Bank robbery without the mask and gun.”109 
Such rhetoric is not, in of itself, a compelling argument that price fixing should be considered 
a crime.  However, I submit that such statements are significant as they may have a normative 
effect and influence public thinking in respect of cartels as criminal enterprises. Public 
                                                          
System of Enforcement', in British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Comparative Aspects of Anti-
Trust Law in the US, the UK and the EEC, (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1963).   
105 Belinda A. Barnett, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement 
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indifference to cartels has been identified as part of the problem with cartel criminalisation, 
outside of the United States, where the Department of Justice has made a concerted effort to 
publicize cartel trials.110  Clarke suggests that the public perception that cartel-related harm is 
not serious has undermined political actors’ will to criminalise cartels. 111   Harding states that 
business crime is generally perceived as having a weak sense of criminality, perhaps owing to 
its elite context of business crime.112     He also suggests that public opinion needs to be led by 
legal opinion, and particularly that of experts, if a convincing case for criminalisation is to be 
made. 113  As such, the views of such important public officials is key in changing the public’s 
perception of the harmfulness of  cartels. 114 
From a regulatory perspective, these three justifications concern whether criminalisation will 
be the correct regulatory approach to cartels in a general sense. The arguments that cartel 
conduct is clearly crime suggest that the criminal law is “the right tool for the job” as I 
mentioned above.  However, these arguments are not concerned with whether this approach 
will be appropriate in the New Zealand context, which I will discuss in Part 4. 
 
III The Bill 
A.  The current legislative response  
So far I have framed the problems that cartels create. Before moving on to the proposed 
reforms, it is important to explore the current anti-cartel regulatory instrument, the Commerce 
Act 1986 (the “Act”).  Price fixing and other activities, as discussed above, are outlawed by 
the Act. 115  Prosecutions for cartel offences are undertaken by its independent competition-law 
enforcement agency, the Commerce Commission.116  The Commission also has specific 
regulatory enforcement duties over a number of regulated industries including 
telecommunications, dairy, electricity, gas pipeline and airports.117 
From a regulatory perspective, the Act represents the law in its expressive function, both as 
threat – coercing compliance by punishing transgressions - and also institutionalizing the 
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normative value of free market competition.  In theory, at least, from a public interest point of 
view the collective good i.e. allocative efficiency, is enhanced when businesspeople do not 
form cartels, and allow prices to be set by free competition.118 The Act’s current regulatory 
approach involves deterring non-compliance via its pecuniary penalty regime.119  
So long as the deterrent effect of the regime is effective then this approach seems sensible. As 
Ogus suggests, “the regulatory regime can do what the market cannot.”120    For, if  the regime 
prevents cartels from operating within New Zealand, then it is preventing market failure.  This 
is an example of regulation enhancing the general welfare of the community – in this case by 
preventing consumers from being “ripped off.”  Of course this is premised on the deterrent 
actually being effective.  This question of efficacy is the one of the key issues underpinning 
the criminalisation debate, and will be discussed in part three of this paper. 
Currently, the Act permits the Commerce Commission to pursue price fixers via civil 
proceedings.     The Act does provide for criminal prosecutions in certain circumstances i.e. for 
breaches of Part 4 of the Act, s80C, which prohibits a person who has been disqualified as a 
director, promoter or manager of a body corporate from taking on such a role: breach of this 
provision can be punishable by up to five years imprisonment.121 
However, price fixing falls under the prohibition against restrictive trade practices in Part 2 of 
the Act, thus only civil proceedings are provided for.122  Upon conviction, price fixers can face 
pecuniary penalties of up to $ 500, 000 for individuals or $ 10 million for body corporates, as 
well as three times the value of the commercial value arising from the breach, or ten per cent 
of turnover.123 
In the recent case of Commerce Commission v Kuene + Nagel AG  the court penalized the 
offender $ 3.1 million.124 In his judgment Venning J characterized the conduct as: 125 
…at the serious end of the spectrum because it was not a one-off transgression but part of 
a sustained course of conduct that gave effect to a covert hard core arrangement. Such 
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conduct is particularly difficult to detect and prosecute. It operated for a significant period 
of time, namely five years. 
Interestingly he also commented that: 
There is no issue as to KNI's ability to pay the recommended penalty. KNI has 
already been fined overseas for its participation in the UK NES agreement: 
• (a)US$1,116,552 by the Department of Justice of the United States; and 
• (b)€5,320,000 by the European Commission of the European Union in relation to 
its involvement in the UK NES agreement in those jurisdictions. 
What I find interesting about his Honour’s comments, is that the level of fine seems to be 
acceptable in part at least because the offender can pay.  One wonders then what deterrent 
effect such penalties have, if any, for what appears to be a serious breach? 
Regardless, from a regulatory theory perspective Morgan and Yeung would doubtless 
characterize this regime as a very straight-forward “Command” approach. 126 Legal rules which 
prohibit cartel conduct are in place, via the Act, and are backed up by sanctions i.e. the penalty 
regime and enforced by a regulatory body, the Commerce Commission.   As well as providing 
for penalties, it also provides for exemptions to the offence provisions. These include an 
authorisation scheme which allows the Commission to authorise certain practices that would 
normally be restrictive, and thus illegal, if they have a sufficient public benefit.127    Exemptions 
for price fixing can also be made in the case of legitimate joint ventures.128  Similarly the 
clearance regime allows concerned businesspeople to manage the risk that an agreement they 
are about to enter may breach s 27, 28 or 29 by seeking a clearance to do so. 129    Finally, the 
Commission is empowered to offer conditional immunity from prosecution, to cartelists who 
agree to provide information regarding their co-conspirators throughout an investigation and 
court proceedings.130 
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B. The Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 
The criminalisation of cartels started its slow but inexorable creep in November 2009.  
Following a round of consultation, Cabinet decided that the prime facie case was made out for 
adding criminal penalties to the existing sanctions against hard-core cartels.131  A Discussion 
Document followed in 2010, and then in June 2011 a Draft Exposure Bill.  Both of these 
received a number of submissions from academics, legal practitioners and the business 
community.132   A Regulatory Impact Statement (“RIS”) was released in June 2011 and The 
Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament on 13 
October 2011. 133 The Bill had its first reading on 24 July 2012 and was subsequently referred 
to the Commerce Committee, who reported back to the House in late September 2012 and May 
2013.  At present the Bill has survived its second reading (over two sessions) in July and 
November 2014, although several Supplementary order papers have been raised. 
While the Bill proposes a number of changes to the existing regime the most relevant of these, 
for the purposes of this paper, is contained in clause 18.134  This clause would insert a new 
provision into the principal Act: section 82B, which introduces a term of imprisonment for up 
to seven years for contravention of s 30. 
Helpfully, the Bill also expressly defines the words “cartel provision” and “price fixing”, which 
do not appear in the current Act. 135  This glaring omission was pointed out in the RIS.136 Some 
submitters, while opposed to criminalisation in general, praised these definitions as enhancing 
certainty and transparency around the anti-cartel provisions.137 
                                                          
131  CAB Min (09) 39/15. 
132  Ministry of Economic Development Cartel Criminalisation Discussion Document (January 2010);  
Submissions on the Discussion Document included those  from  Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Professor 
Christopher Harding, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, Russell Mc Veagh and the Business 
Roundtable.  <http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-policy/cartel-
criminalisation/submissions-on-discussion-document-cartel-criminalisation/?searchterm=cartel%2A  >  ; 
Submissions on the Exposure Draft Bill included those from Beaton-Wells and Fisse,  The New Zealand Law 
Society, Telecom and Air New Zealand < http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-
policy/cartel-criminalisation/submissions-cartel-criminalisation/?searchterm=cartel%2A > . 
133 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80.  
134 Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2)  cl 18.  
135 Clause 7.  
136 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80, at  14   
137 Russell McVeagh “Submission to the Commerce Committee: Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) 
Amendment Bill” at 7   < http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/sc/documents/evidence/50SCCO_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL11153_1_A275530/russell-mcveagh >. 
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When the Bill is enacted, clause 7 would see ss 30 to 33 repealed and replaced with “cartel 
provisions” which are defined as:138 
“30A Meaning of cartel provision and related terms 
“(1) A cartel provision is a provision, contained in a contract, arrangement, 
or understanding, that has the purpose, effect, or 
likely effect of 1 or more of the following in relation to the 30 
supply or acquisition of goods or services in New Zealand: 
“(a) price fixing: 
“(b) restricting output: 
“(c) market allocating. 
Price fixing is at the top of the list of proscribed cartel activities and, very helpfully, expressly 
defined as follows: 139 
“(2) In this Act, price fixing means, as between the parties to a contract, 
arrangement, or understanding, fixing, controlling, or 
maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling, or maintaining 
of,— 
“(a) the price for goods or services that any 2 or more parties 
to the contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or 
acquire in competition with each other; or 
“(b) any discount, allowance, rebate, or credit in relation to 
goods or services that any 2 or more parties to the contract, 
arrangement, or understanding supply or acquire 
in competition with each other 
This is certainly a step further than s 30 of the current Act, which outlaws contracts which have 
the effect of fixing price, but does not so explicitly describe the mischief for which it was 
drafted. 
Earlier in this paper I touched on the distinction that is often made between regulatory offences 
and so-called “true crimes”, the mental fault element.   Given the importance of mens rea to 
criminal liability, the Bill now expressly provides for the requisite mental fault for cartel 
offences:140 
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
“(a) the person,— 
“(i) in contravention of section 30, enters into a contract or arrangement, or arrives at an 
understanding, that contains a cartel provision; and 
(ii) intends, at that time, to engage in price fixing (emphasis added) restricting output, or 
market allocating, or bid rigging (as those terms are defined in section 30A); 
or 
                                                          
138  Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2)   cl 7.  
139  Clause 7.  
140 Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2) cl 18.  
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“(b) the person,— 5 
“(i) in contravention of section 30, gives effect to a contract, arrangement, or understanding 
that contains a cartel provision; and 
“(ii) intends (emphasis added), at the time the contract, arrangement, or understanding is given 
effect to, to engage in price fixing, restricting output, or market allocating, or bid rigging (as 
those terms are defined in section 30A). 
 
The wording is clear that intent is the mental fault requirement.  In their submission to the 
Select Committee Beaton-Wells and Fisse recommended that intention be defined differently 
from the proposed Australian legislation, with intent being construed in the “sense of meaning 
to engage in the conduct. “ 141   This is a markedly different threshold from that proposed by 
the Australian Exposure Draft Bill, which required a dishonest intent to obtain a benefit.142  
Beaton-Wells and Fisse suggested that this was an element that New Zealand should not adopt 
into its offence provision on the basis that dishonesty is unrelated to the primary problem i.e. 
collusive practices which damage the competitive process. 143 They also felt that the dishonesty 
element would give rise to a great deal of uncertainty in cartel prosecutions due to the imprecise 
nature of the “standards of ordinary people” test adopted by the Australian courts.144   Similarly, 
the Commerce Commission submitted that dishonesty had been a problematic element in UK 
attempts to enforce criminal sanctions against cartels. 145 
 
As well as clarifying proscribed conduct, the Bill also provides for a defence to prosecution:  
that the cartel provision was honestly believed to be necessary for a collaborative activity, 
defined as: 146 
“(2) In this Act, collaborative activity means an enterprise, venture, 
or other activity, in trade, that— 
“(a) is carried on in co-operation by 2 or more persons; and 15 
“(b) is not carried on for the dominant purpose of lessening 
competition between any 2 or more of the parties. 
“(3) The purpose referred to in subsection (2)(b) may be inferred 
                                                          
141 Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse  “Submission  For The Ministry Of Economic Development (Nz)  
Commerce (Cartels And Other Matters) Amendment Bill” at 5.   < http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-
services/business/competition-policy/cartel-criminalisation/documents-images/Caron%20Beaton-
Wells%20and%20Brent%20Fisse%20-245%20KB%20PDF.pdf >. 
142 Exposure Draft Bill Trade Practices Amendment (Cartels and Other Measures) Bill 2008, s 44ZZRF (Cth). 
143 Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2) cl 18 ; Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent 
Fisse  The Australian Criminal Cartel Regime: A Model for New Zealand ?   SSRN Electronic Journal August 
2008 at 2.3  <  http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228192335 >. 
144 Beaton-Wells and Fisse,  The Australian Criminal Cartel Regime: A Model for New Zealand ?, above n    
143, at 2.3. 
145 Commerce Commission “The Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill: Submission to 
Commerce Select Committee” at 31. < http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/sc/documents/evidence/50SCCO_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL11153_1_A273131/commerce-commission  >. 
146 Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2011 (341-2) cl 7. 
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from the conduct of any relevant person or from any other 
relevant circumstance. 
Under s 31 such collaborative activities are exempted from the prohibition in s 30.  The 
Commerce Commission submitted that this defence was unnecessary, but should it be retained,  
require a belief that was both honest and reasonable. This was so that careless or wilfully blind 
defendants would not escape liability.147 
 
C. Procedural and Evidential implications 
The addition of criminal penalties will also have a range of procedural implications for cartel 
prosecutions.   Firstly, the decision-making process in determining whether or not to undertake 
a prosecution will follow the Criminal Prosecution Guidelines, which mirror the Solicitor-
General’s Prosecution Guidelines document.148  This means that the Commission will now be 
required to satisfy both the Evidential and Public Interest tests before initiating a prosecution, 
which require that:149 
14.1 the evidence which can be adduced in court is sufficient to provide a “reasonable 
prospect of conviction”: the Evidential Test; and 
14.2 criminal prosecution is required in the public interest: the Public Interest Test. 
In terms of satisfying the Evidential Test, reference will need to be made directly to the 
Evidence Act 2006, with its considerations of reliability and admissibility.150 These are the 
same tests that the Police Prosecution Service must undertake before commencing a 
prosecution.151  This is not a completely foreign exercise for the Commission, who already 
apply these tests, with respect to their capacity to initiate criminal proceedings for 
contraventions of Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986.  However, now the same approach will 
be taken to breaches of Part 2 of the Act.      
Similarly, proceedings will now be subject to the criminal standard and burden of proof i.e. 
that the prosecution will have to prove guilt to “beyond reasonable doubt.”152  This increased 
                                                          
147 Commerce Commission “Submission to Commerce Select Committee”, above n 145, at 32.2 
148 Commerce Commission Criminal Prosecution Guidelines  (October 2013) at 3     
<  http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/commission-policies/criminal-prosecution-guidelines/> ;    
Crown Law Office Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013.      
 < http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/artman/docs/cat_index_13.asp >. 
149  Commerce Commission Criminal Prosecution Guidelines, above n 148, at 14. 
150  At 5.  
151  Police Prosecution Service Statement of Policy and Practice 2013 (July 2013).  
152 Simester and Sullivan,  Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, above n 9,  at  54. 
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threshold of proof may make it much more difficult for the Commission to secure convictions, 
as opposed to under the lower civil “balance of probabilities” standard.153  
Another implication that arises is the difficulty and expense associated with jury trials. A 
maximum 7 year term of imprisonment makes place price fixing a Category three offence, for 
the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the “CPA”). 154  The CPA provides for 
offenders charged with a Category three offence the right to elect trial by jury.155  It would 
seem that this provision will now apply to cartelists facing criminal penalties. Jury trials in 
competition law matters are not uncommon in the American jurisdiction. The guaranteed right 
to a jury trial from the Seventh Amendment to the United States’ Constitution, and the similar 
rights contained in the Australian Constitution have been applied in complex competition law 
cases.156 
Jury trials also have implications in terms of additional enforcement costs.  The selection and 
empanelling of a jury would add expense, as would the in the increased difficulty of proving a 
charge sufficiently to satisfy twelve community members.157 Proceedings will also become 
more prolonged, as juries will likely be faced with both highly complex commercial 
information, and difficult determinations regarding the necessary mens rea elements. 158 
Finally,  Commerce Commission prosecutions can be presided over by a Justice of the High 
Court sitting alongside a lay expert.  Bell Gully submitted that the practice of having an expert 
work with a judge was indispensable, as it compensated for any lack of knowledge or 
experience on the part of the judicial officer. 159   This approach may be fall into disuse if jury 
trials become the norm.  
Similarly, a criminal prosecution affords defendants and co-defendants the right to not provide 
evidence, the so-called “right to silence”, as well as the other protective provisions of the 
Evidence Act 2006.160  In its submission to the Commerce Committee Bell Gully noted that 
                                                          
153  At 54. 
154 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 6.  
155 Section 50.  
156 For a US example Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) the trial took 14 
months with 38 days of jury deliberations;  As price fixing is an indictable offence under the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (formerly the Trade Practices Act)  s 80 of the Australian Constitution guarantees a right to 
a jury trial.  
157 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80, at 81.  
158 At 80. 
159 Bell Gully “Submission to the Commerce Select Committee on the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) 
Amendment Bill)”  at 36(e)  <  http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/sc/documents/evidence/50SCCO_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL11153_1_A274903/bell-gully >. 
160 Evidence Act 2006, s 73.  
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under current law the Commerce Act 1986 does not provide for the right to silence, in respect 
of the provision of information or documents to the Commission -  although statements made 
in answer to questions asked by the Commission are not admissible in either criminal or civil 
proceedings.161 If this provision applies in a Commission-initiated criminal proceeding the 
Commission will have access to evidence that, although inadmissible, it would not ordinarily 
have seen before a trial.   This raises issues of trial fairness, an important aspect of criminal 
proceedings, as it potentially would provide a significant strategic advantage that enforcement 
bodies would not ordinarily have. 162 Should a full “right to silence” even be available in such 
proceedings? This could potentially give rise to prisoner’s dilemma scenarios, where none of 
the defendants testify and prosecutions collapse for want of evidence.  King suggests that 
leniency provisions have the effect of destabilizing calculated silence, as they incentivize 
conspirators to provide information against each other cartelists in order to escape 
punishment.163 
Another important aspect of the Bill is how it alters the Act’s interactions with other legislative 
regimes, particularly evidence-gathering ones.  One of the reasons the Commerce Commission 
was in favour of criminalisation, because it would allow them to access additional tools of 
evidence gathering, under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 164    Part 4 of the Search and 
Surveillance Act 2012 would apply to Commission investigations as the length of the proposed 
term of imprisonment would permit the use of trespass surveillance and interception techniques 
(which are prohibited, unless used to obtain evidence for an offence that is punishable by at 
least 7 years). 165 
The Commission also submitted that criminalisation would assist in matters of cooperation 
between New Zealand and overseas anti-cartel enforcement agencies. 166  In a general sense, 
the idea of harmonisation with overseas regulation was also one of the stated objectives 
announced at the Bill’s first reading.167  More specifically, making cartel conduct a criminal 
offence would allow for enhanced cooperation with international competition agencies by 
                                                          
161 Bell Gully “Submission to the Commerce Select Committee on the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) 
Amendment Bill)” above n 159, at 36; Commerce Act 1986, s 106(4).  
162 Bell Gully “Submission to the Commerce Select Committee on the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) 
Amendment Bill)” , above n 159, at 36(b); 
163 King Criminalisation of Cartel Behaviour, above n 49, at 26.  
164 Commerce Commission “The Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill  Submission to 
Commerce Select Committee”, above n 145, at 12.3.   
165 Search and Surveillance Act 2012,  s45.  
166 Commerce Commission “ Submission to Commerce Select Committee”, above n 155, at 12. 
167 ( 24 July 2012)   682  NZPD at  3869. 
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allowing the Commission to access the New Zealand legislation that regulates requests for 
assistance with criminal matters from overseas states.168  Specifically the Bill will bring cartel 
offences within the scope of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992 (“MACMA”) 
and allow the Commerce Commission to employ the MACMA.   Requests for assistance with 
criminal cartel prosecutions will be able to be made through the Crown Law Office. 169 
Furthermore, the Commission would be able to rely on the Extradition Act 1999, as extradition 
offences are defined as those which are punishable by at least 12 months imprisonment. 170    
While not all submitters agreed that enhanced international cooperation is sufficient 
justification for criminalisation, it is not difficult to see the attraction of the Commission 
gaining access to MACMA and the Extradition Act in order to better investigate and prosecute 
overseas-based cartelists who operate in New Zealand. 171 
 
IV The Criminalisation Debate 
A. Opposition to criminalisation 
I have already discussed the arguments which suggest that cartel conduct should be 
conceptualized as crime and the practical implications of such a change.   I will now explore 
the arguments, both for and against, importing this conceptualization into the New Zealand 
jurisdiction. 
First, several general concerns were raised about the necessity of criminalisation. A number of 
submitters have also suggested that from a numerical perspective cartels do not appear to be a 
serious threat to the New Zealand economy.  Submitters referred to the small number of cartel 
cases prosecuted in New Zealand, on average less than one per year. 172  Overall, a lack of 
                                                          
168 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80, at  70. 
169 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, s 10.  
170 Extradition Act 1999, ss 4,61.  
171 NOTE: Over the 2014-2015 summer I worked at the Crown Law Office, as a law clerk for the Criminal 
Process Team, among my tasks was the processing of several MACMA requests – which I thoroughly enjoyed, 
mostly due to the challenge involved with reconciling foreign documentation and formulations of law with the 
requirements of MACMA (irrespective of translation anomalies !) Part of the difficulty in processing these 
requests was working out whether the conduct in question was indeed a criminal offence (punishable by at least 
2 years in prison), so any clarification of whether an offence is criminal or not is highly significant in terms of 
international cooperation.  
172 Business NZ  “Submission  By Business NZ to  The Commerce Select Committee  on the  Commerce 
(Cartels & Other Matters) Amendment Bill” at  4.10   < < http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/sc/documents/evidence/50SCCO_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL11153_1_A275436/business-new-zealand> 
 ; Bell Gully “submission on MED Cartel Criminalisation – Exposure Draft Commerce (Cartels and Other 
Matters) Amendment Bill”  at 8-10   < < http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-
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statistically useful empirical information was promoted as a reason not to proceed with 
criminalisation.173  Furthermore, given that the Courts had yet to mete out the maximum 
penalties, there was no indication that the current regime was insufficient to deter cartels. 174 
From reading the RIS, Submissions on the Discussion Document, the Draft Exposure Bill and 
the Bill itself, four general themes of opposition to criminalisation emerge including: 
• That criminalisation is simply unnecessary. 
• That it will have a “chilling effect” on competition. 
• That it will significantly increase costs. 
• That international cooperation/harmonisation is insufficient justification for the change. 
While I will outline these arguments, I will not attempt to substantively refute them, although 
I will mention some obvious counter-arguments. This is mostly because any discussion of the 
likely consequences of criminalisation is highly speculative.  Even with evidence and 
commentary available from other jurisdictions, just how criminalisation will function in New 
Zealand’s particular economic environment is guesswork at best. 
 
B. The “Chilling effect” and Costs 
The RIS conceded that any uncertainty with respect to the new penalties may result in more 
risk-averse behaviour and a corresponding reduction in entrepreneurship and innovation.175  
This so-called “chilling effect” on legitimate competitive conduct was also mentioned by 
several submitters.  176  The last of these submitted that while the small number of business 
                                                          
policy/cartel-criminalisation/submissions-on-discussion-document-cartel-criminalisation/documents-
images/Comp.0037%20-%20Bell-Gully.pdf > 
; Air New Zealand  “Cartel-Criminalisation Discussion Document” < http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-
services/business/competition-policy/cartel-criminalisation/submissions-on-discussion-document-cartel-
criminalisation/documents-images/Comp.0036%20-%20Air-New-Zealand.pdf >. 
173 New Zealand Business Roundtable “Submission to the Ministry of Economic Development on the 
Discussion Document Cartel Criminalisation” <  http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-
policy/cartel-criminalisation/submissions-on-discussion-document-cartel-criminalisation/documents-
images/Comp.0023%20-%20Business-Roundtable.pdf  > . 
174 Simpson Grierson “Submissions on the Discussion Document on Cartel Criminalisation” at 2.2-2.4. <  
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-policy/cartel-criminalisation/submissions-on-
discussion-document-cartel-criminalisation/documents-images/Comp.0039%20-%20Simpson-Grierson.pdf >. 
 
175 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80, at 74.  
176 Air New Zealand “Cartel-Criminalisation Discussion Document” above n 172, at 1;  New Zealand Business 
Roundtable “Submission to the Ministry of Economic Development on the Discussion Document Cartel 
Criminalisation” , above n 173, at 3.3;  Buddle Findlay “Submission on the Commerce (Cartels and Other 
Matters) Amendment Bill” at 12 and 17  <  http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/sc/documents/evidence/50SCCO_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL11153_1_A275432/buddle-findlay >. 
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people who wish to engage in cartel activities may indeed be deterred, this may be at the price 
of reducing the incentive to honest business people to compete vigourously. 177  However none 
of the submitters, who opposed criminalisation, gave examples of the types of legitimate 
conduct that has been or would be disincentivized, and referred to this problem in very general 
terms.  This suggests that while they have raised a legitimate concern, the degree to which that 
concern may be realised is highly speculative. 
The need to avoid regulatory over-reach was also identified by the Commerce Commission, in 
their submission in support of the Bill. The Commission suggested that the s 31 exemption 
should expressly refer to considerations of whether the collaborative activity was efficiency 
enhancing or had a procompetitive purpose – essentially a “rule of reason” approach similar to 
that applied in the Broadcast Music case. 178 
The RIS also referred to the chilling effect, in the context of being part of the cost of 
criminalisation.179  It also pointed to the practical expenses associated with administration and 
enforcement. In particular it conceded that prosecutions would become more expensive, given 
the higher criminal standard of proof and the likelihood of complex jury trials.180  In terms of 
the cost of imprisonment it noted that the United States, by comparison, have imprisoned less 
than 400 people for cartel offences in the last decade. 181  The small number of cartel 
prosecutions in New Zealand is very small, approximately one per year. 182   Even if this number 
increased tenfold, it is unlikely to contribute significantly to the prison population, which in 
2012 stood at 10,160. 183  
The issue of investigation, prosecution and punishment costs exceeding potential benefits was 
also raised, as well as the likelihood of increased compliance costs for businesses to avoid the 
possibility of falling afoul of the law.184  As mentioned above, criminal trials may involve juries 
                                                          
; Business NZ  “Submission by Business NZ to the Select Committee on the Commerce (Cartels and Other 
Matters) Amendment Bill” , above n 172, at 4.8 – 4.10 . 
177 Buddle Findlay “ Submission on the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill”  above n 176, 
at 16. 
178 Commerce Commission “ Submission to Commerce Select Committee”, above n 145, at 16-25; Broadcast 
Music Inc v Columbia Broadcasting Systems  441  US 1 (1979). 
179 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80,at 79.  
180 At 79-81. 
181 At 80-83. 
182 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80, at 79-82.  
183 Statistics New Zealand  New Zealand Official Yearbook 2012 < 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/yearbook/society/crime/corrections.aspx >. 
184 Air New Zealand “Cartel-Criminalisation Discussion Document”, above n 172, at 3;  
 Bell Gully “Submission On MED Cartel Criminalisation – Exposure Draft Commerce (Cartels And Other 
Matters) Amendment Bill”, above n 172,  at 14; Simpson Grierson “Submissions on the Discussion Document 
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which will add expense to the proceedings.  Imprisonment itself is costly, in part due to the 
inherent expense of incarceration, but also due to the inevitable type one errors (the 
imprisonment of the innocent) which may occur.185  In response to these concerns, again, the 
small number of cartel prosecutions per year suggest that neither over litigation nor 
imprisonment costs will rise significantly.186 
Finally, it was submitted that the RIS had not performed a proper cost-benefit analysis, and if 
it had then it would have found that criminalisation was not worth the required 
expenditure. 187 As a general answer to concerns regarding the costs and benefits of 
criminalisation Calvani suggests that the increased procedural safeguards do not necessarily 
mean that marginal prosecutorial cost will exceed the marginal deterrent benefit. 188 Rather, 
he argues that the US approach of imprisoning cartelists has yielded an enhanced deterrent 
effect which outweighs the additional costs involved with a criminal defence. 189 
C. International cooperation/harmonisation 
One of the Government’s stated goals, in pursing cartel criminalisation, is enhancing New 
Zealand’s capacity to cooperate with other jurisdictions in anti-cartel activities.190   Some 
submitters have suggested that this might be the primary justification for criminalisation, and 
questioned whether that justification is sufficient.191 Submitters argued that the enhancement 
of international co-operation should not be considered an end in itself, but rather be evaluated 
based on its economic benefit to New Zealand. 192 They also suggested that overseas regulators 
are generally hesitant to share confidential information, and that despite allowing the 
                                                          
on Cartel Criminalisation ” , above n 174, at 6.4.;  Business NZ  “Submission by Business NZ to MED on the 
Draft Commerce (Cartels & Other Matters) Amendment Bill” at 6.3-6.7 < http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-
services/business/competition-policy/cartel-criminalisation/documents-
images/Business%20New%20Zealand%20-254%20KB%20PDF.pdf > . 
185 King Criminalisation of Cartel Behaviour, above n 49, at 16. 
186 At 83.  
187 New Zealand Business Roundtable “ Submission on the Ministry of Economic Development Exposure Draft 
Cartel Criminalisation” July 2011 at 3.1-3.9  < http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/competition-
policy/cartel-criminalisation/documents-images/New%20Zealand%20Business%20Roundtable%20-
78%20KB%20PDF.pdf> . 
188 Calvani Cartel “Sanctions and deterrence”, above n 56, at 195.  
189  At 195.  
190 ( 24 July 2012)  682  NZPD at  3869. 
191  Simpson Grierson “Submissions on the Discussion Document on Cartel Criminalisation” , above n 174, at 
2.2-6.5.; Buddle Findlay “Submission on the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill” , above n 
176, at 12. 
192  Bell Gully  “Submission on MED Cartel Criminalisation” above n 172, at 5;  Business NZ “Submission by 
Business NZ on the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill”  above n 172,  at 4.17. 
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Commerce Commission to access the MACMA regime, very little material benefit would be 
realised. 193 
David Matthews, General Counsel and Company Secretary of Fonterra Co-operative limited,  
suggested, in a private capacity, that any desire to harmonise with Australian law was cause 
for concern.194  He suggested that Australia only legislated for criminal penalties in order to 
secure a Free Trade Agreement with the United States – and without properly consulting with 
New Zealand, despite a previous agreement to do so on competition law matters.  As such, 
harmonisation should only be pursued if the resulting laws are improvements on previous ones. 
To summarise these arguments, from a regulatory perspective, the overall concern seems to be 
that criminalisation will have no net economic benefit when weighed against the costs.  As 
such it represents over-regulation of the market. Rather than combating misallocation of 
resources in the market, it will instead create a misallocation of both State and corporate 
resources through increased procedural and compliance costs.   Again, I suggest that these 
concerns are speculative.  However, given the level of concern, the New Zealand Law Society’s 
submission seems eminently sensible: that when passed the new Act should require a statement 
of objectives to be issued, which would be reviewed after five years. 195 
As I stated above, I have not tried to substantively refute any of these arguments. However, I 
feel obliged to provide a little context from which a reader may judge for themselves the degree 
to which some of the submitters’ objections can be taken at face value.   Much in the same way 
complaints about speeding fines from so-called “boy racers” are not afforded serious 
consideration, it is difficult to endorse some of these submissions when they represent cartel 
offenders.  Recently, Air New Zealand admitted to breaches of s 27 and s 30, and was ordered 
to pay $7.5 million in fines and costs of $ 300,000 and $ 259, 079. In Venning J’s words:  196 
The conduct in this case (price-fixing) is at the serious end of the spectrum 
of the types of conduct prohibited by the Act. 
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Air New Zealand suggesting that there is no need to criminalise price fixing is a bit like a wolf 
suggesting that there is no need for sheep farmers to build fences. 
 
D. Deterrence theory and problems with fines 
Deterrence is a key theme, if not the key theme, of the criminalisation debate. From a regulatory 
perspective, Morgan and Yeung might suggest that deterrence is a functional aspect of 
command: the process of controlling socially-undesirable behaviour via coercive sanctions. 197  
Calvani describes deterrence as the raison d’etre of cartel penalty regimes. 198 Similarly, the 
OECD has stated that the principal purpose of sanctions in cartel cases is deterrence, and that 
sanctions should remove the prospect of gain from criminal activity. 199 
Contemporary deterrence theory suggests that in order to effectively deter conduct punishment 
must be certain and reasonably swift – the greater the certainty of punishment, the greater the 
disinclination to participate in a proscribed activity.200  Deterrence can be specific, in that it 
deters a particular person from repeating their proscribed conduct, or general, in that it deters 
the citizenry from breaking the rules. 201   Essentially, deterrence relies on the calculation of a 
potential offender that the reasons not to offend outweigh those in favour of proscribed 
conduct. 202 
Deterrence theory has been criticized in its application to criminal offending because it relies 
on offenders making a rational decision having first performed the cost/benefit or risk/reward 
arithmetic - which is seldom the case in crimes of violence.203  In contrast, the theory would 
seem to apply well for cartelists, who are required to make a conscious choice to collude and 
are also likely to have the capacity, as businesspeople, for cost/benefit analyses.204  In the 
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context of cartels, both specific and general deterrence are desirable.  Businesspeople should 
be disincentivized from colluding to fix prices, and those who are already engaged in such 
activities, and get caught, are incentivized to refrain from repeating their crimes. 205 
Of course the deterrence debate is not about whether or not cartelists should be deterred but 
rather the method by which such deterrence will be most effectively and efficiently achieved.  
That the government is considering following Australia in criminalising cartels suggests that 
the current pecuniary penalty scheme is perceived as sub-optimal in its deterrent effect. 
The key problem with fines is that the level of penalty imposed against price fixers is generally 
too low to effectively deter cartelists.206  Wils suggests that with a mark-up of 10 per cent over 
a five year duration, that the optimal fine would be at least 150 per cent of annual turnover 
related to products concerned by the violation.207   Wils’ calculation has been cited by Calvani, 
King and Whelan, and was also accepted by the OECD in its Report on the nature and impact 
of hard core cartels.208  Only with fines set at such a level would cartelists’ risk/reward 
calculations break down based on the low rates of detection – Wils estimated a 33 per cent 
chance of detection and punishment at best. 
While fines at such levels might have a real deterrent effect, they are highly problematic for 
several reasons.  First, approximately, 60 per cent of firms would be unable to pay such a high 
penalty without entering bankruptcy.209   This would have the perverse effect of actually 
reducing competition, as firms went out of business.210 Secondly, the liquidations arising from 
such fines would result in serious economic consequences for employees, shareholders and 
creditors.211 
Thirdly, given the above consequences, policy-makers would be reluctant to create such drastic 
fines and the judiciary would also be reluctant to impose them –which would undermine their 
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deterrent effect.212  King also suggested that difficulty would arise in courts actually calculating 
an appropriate optimal fine.213 King, in agreeing with Wils, argued that the current level of 
fines in New Zealand, is far below the optimal level to deter would-be cartelists, as the benefits 
of cheating outweigh the penalty, coupled with the low chance of detection. 214 
Alternatively, fines can be imposed on individuals. 215 Prima facie this seems logical. As 
Calvani points out, prices are fixed by individuals, not corporations. 216    Therefore, sanctions 
should be focussed on the individual actors.217   However, individuals who are convicted of 
price fixing are unlikely to be able to pay fines themselves and are thus are either “judgment 
proof” or can be indemnified against such penalties by their employer, the corporation who has 
benefitted from their illegal activities.218  The RIS suggests that cartelists subvert often this 
prohibition by either paying individuals “up front”, paying additional remuneration/bonuses 
after the fine or making payments to them outside of New Zealand’s jurisdiction.219    Calvani  
also suggests that the sheer difficulty in devising and then imposing an effective fine regime 
for individuals is thus prohibitive. 220  
In summary, it has been argued that fines are simply an ineffective deterrent at current levels, 
but cannot be practicably raised to effective levels. 221 Therefore, a different kind of deterrent 
is not just desirable, but necessary.222 
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E. Criminal penalties 
Clearly the Bill reflects the belief that criminal penalties will be more effective as a 
deterrent.223    But why is this so?  Why is the deprivation of liberty perceived as an inherently 
more serious penalty than a large fine?  Simester suggests that criminal liability carries a much 
more serious stigma than other types of offending.224  However, I suspect it is more likely that 
prison terms are so daunting because they are, as Hampton and Scott suggest a non-
indemnifiable penalty. 225   Furthermore, imprisonment is an individual penalty which directly 
targets the people responsible for the proscribed conduct, punishing them rather than the 
company – which in effect may be punishing shareholders and employees. 226  Imprisonment 
also seems to address Libman’s point, that a problematic element of regulatory enforcement 
is that often the transgressor is able to immediately return to the regulated activity, despite 
conviction and punishment. 227  In contrast, a prison sentence ensures that the offender is 
removed from the regulatory activity completely, if even for a short time. 
These views are echoed by Barnett, speaking from the US experience of anti-cartel 
enforcement, who describes prison as a punishment for which an employer cannot reimburse 
an employee: 228 
As a corporate executive once told a former Assistant Attorney General of ours: “[A]s 
long as you are only talking about money, the company can at the end of the day take care 
of me . . . but once you begin talking about taking away my liberty, there is nothing that 
the company can do for me.”1 Executives often offer to pay higher fines to get a break 
on their jail time, but they never offer to spend more time in prison in order to get a 
discount on their fine. 
 
Similarly, after the successful prosecution of the Visy cardboard box cartel, ACCC chairman 
Graeme Samuel suggested that “nothing concentrates the mind of an executive contemplating 
creating or participating in a cartel more than the prospect of a criminal conviction and a stretch 
in jail." 229  The Australian legislature had a similar view and subsequently passed legislation 
making price fixing an indictable offence, punishable by up to 10 years in prison. 230  Clarke 
also surmises that it is difficult to place a dollar value on the loss of freedom and the stigma of 
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a criminal conviction – which is likely to make imprisonment a daunting prospect to business 
executives.231 
Despite such tough talk whether imprisonment is actually more effective than fines has yet to 
be conclusively determined.  King concedes that there is no hard evidence on whether the 
addition of criminalisation actually increases the law’s deterrent effect.  However there is  
anecdotal evidence, from US Department of Justice interviews with international cartelists, 
which supports the proposition that criminal penalties deter cartels from operating within the 
American jurisdiction. 232  This view is supported by Wils, who suggests that the US experience 
provides ample evidence that Arthur Liman’s 1997 statement is accurate: 233 
``For the purse snatcher, a term in the penitentiary may be little more unsettling than basic 
training in the army. To the businessman, however, prison is the inferno, and conventional 
risk-reward analysis breaks down when the risk is jail. The threat of imprisonment, 
therefore, remains the most meaningful deterrent to antitrust violations'' 
Wils provides the high-profile example of elderly billionaire A. Alfred Taubman owner of 
Sotheby’s auction house, sentenced to one year in prison (as well as US $ 7.5 million in 
criminal fines and US $ 150 million in civil pecuniary penalties). 234 
In their submission on the Cartels Discussion Document Meredith Connell, holder of the 
Crown Solicitor’s Warrant, made some comments regarding the deterrent value of prison 
terms. 235 In acting for the Commerce Commission in Commerce Commission v Siemens AG  
Meredith Connell prosecuted Siemens for participation in a global cartel which fixed prices of 
gas insulated switchgear in New Zealand. 236 The firm noted that the cartelists expressly 
operated outside of North America.  According to their witnesses the reluctance to offend 
within the American jurisdiction was based on the perception that in  the United States “people 
go to prison” for price fixing.237  Furthermore, they noted the attitude of a key witness that the 
cartel’s operations were technically illegal, but not wrong – while pecuniary penalties, “only 
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money” were the only risk.  They were of the view that criminal penalties not only undermined 
the risk-reward analysis, but also sent the message that cartel activities were not mere technical 
illegalities but serious offences. 
Anecdotes aside, how has imprisonment worked in practice, for those countries who have 
chosen to add it to the regulatory arsenal?    Criminal penalties are available for cartel offending 
in Estonia, Russia, Ireland, Japan, Brazil, Korea, Canada the United Kingdom and the United 
States.238  No sentences of imprisonment have been handed out in Estonia or Russia and Irish 
Courts have suspended every custodial sentence delivered.239  While Canadian courts have 
given out terms of imprisonment, these have been commuted to community service in all cases 
bar one.240   The United Kingdom has jailed price fixers, including three oil executives for 
terms of 2 and ½ to three years.241  However, British enforcement  has also suffered some 
humiliating setbacks,  in particular the high profile failure of the prosecution of British Airways 
and Virgin Airlines, for price fixing on fuel surcharges. 242 
The story is somewhat different in the United States, not only have the number of prosecutions 
increased, but also the terms of imprisonment imposed. 243  The average term of imprisonment 
served has increased from 8.7 months in 1998, to 30.8 months in 2007 (although this trend is 
not without its crests and troughs, in 2005 the average was 24.4 months, but in 2006 it was only 
9.4). 244 What can be said is that American courts are generally more likely to give out custodial 
sentences in price fixing cases, than those of other jurisdictions.245 
In summary, other than anecdotal evidence there does not seem to be much proof that criminal 
penalties alone deter price fixers.   However, the vigour with which the American authorities 
approach prosecuting and seeking jail terms for such offenders complimented by evidence  that 
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suggests international cartelists are hesitant to operate within the US, does seem to suggest that 
criminalisation has at least some deterrent effect. 
 
F. Deterrence disputed 
It is worth remembering that deterrence is not actually a goal in of itself.   As I suggested in 
the introduction, deterrence is merely a contributory means to achieve the overall regulatory 
goal of maintaining market integrity by safeguarding competition against cartels.   In this 
context Parker describes the policy of deterrence, underpinning the criminalisation of cartels, 
as a an attempt to impose a social control, which in turn relies on the rationality of participants 
in the regulated activity – in this case business competitors in a market.246 
As suggested above, the deterrent value of criminal sanctions is questionable.  Some dispute 
whether it will have any effect at all. In particular,   Parker argues that the policy of deterrence 
that underpins cartel criminalisation ignores the way that businesspeople understand and 
interact with competition law.247   Although businesspeople are generally rational actors those 
who do not understand anti-cartel law ignore it.  Their surprise, when they are caught within 
its grasp, suggests that its general deterrent value is low. 248 
In contrast, those who are intimate with anti-cartel law can attempt to game the system, which 
again undermines its deterrent effect.   Even if criminal penalties, and enhanced investigative 
powers become a reality, these players merely find more sophisticated methods of gaming. The 
escalation of consequences, rather than deterring cartel conduct, simply escalates the 
sophistication of cartelists’ avoidance and indemnification tactics.249 
In its submission on the Draft Exposure Bill, Bell Gully argued that given the small number of 
anti-cartel proceedings taken by the Commission each year, the deterrent effect of 
criminalisation would be minimal.250   Similarly, Air New Zealand described the belief that 
criminal penalties will have a greater deterrent effect than a punitive personal fine an 
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unsubstantiated assumption.251   Furthermore, that most participants in cartels do so from sheer 
ignorance or a mistaken belief about the lawfulness of their activities.252 
A further challenge to the deterrent effect of criminal penalties was based on the increased 
standard and burden of proof involved in criminal prosecutions, along with the increased rights 
of defence.253  It was argued that since cases will be more difficult for prosecuting agencies to 
win, the actual deterrent effect will be lower. 254 
At first, from a common-sense perspective there appears to be some force in these arguments.  
It certainly is conceivable that given the complexity of competition law mistakes can be made. 
However, it precisely for the avoidance of such risk that businesspeople obtain the advice of 
legal counsel.  In terms of promulgating clear rules, the Commerce Commission maintains a 
very straightforward webpage which outlines proscribed conduct.255  Also, as discussed above, 
the Bill will add some clarity to the kinds of conduct that are prohibited, with its express 
inclusion of the definition for price fixing and other cartel conduct. 
There is also the question of how effective a deterrent imprisonment will be against overseas 
cartelists.  While imprisonment may be a viable deterrent against domestic offenders, problems 
arise when the offenders are located overseas.  In reviewing the US approach Connor points to 
a number of issues that have arisen from the reliance of criminal penalties to deter international 
cartelists including: 1) the complications arising from a jury trials 2) the failure of extradition 
processes to keep pace with developments in criminal enforcement and 3)the lack of usable 
statistics regarding imprisonment.256   While these points are concerning the Bill does take a 
step towards addressing them by allowing the Commission to make use of MACMA and the 
Extradition Act. 
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G.  Criminal penalties and leniency schemes 
As suggested above there is no conclusive proof that criminal penalties, in of themselves, deter 
cartelists more so than fines.   The deterrent effect of severe penalties, criminal or civil is likely 
undermined by the low detection rate for cartel activity.  The RIS suggests the chance of 
detection is somewhere between 10-20%, which is in line with 16% (or 1 in 6) as suggested by 
Calvani and King. 257  However, when combined with leniency programmes criminal penalties 
appear to increase the rate of detection of cartels – and certainty of detection is arguably more 
of a deterrent than the threat of a severe punishment alone.258  Thus deterrence and detection 
become interrelated concepts, when viewed in the context of leniency programmes.   
Leniency programmes, which originated in the United States, offer reduced penalties to 
cartelists who inform on their co-conspirators, appear to substantially increase the number of 
cartels detected.259  In theory, criminal penalties enhance the attractiveness of leniency schemes 
by incentivizing cartelists to implicate each other, in an attempt to avoid incarceration. 
Scott Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Division of the US Department 
of Justice, argues that in the American experience criminal sanctions do make leniency 
schemes more appealing, which in turn greatly increases the number of cartels that are 
detected.260   He reports that while the original 1978 leniency programme was ineffective, 
revisions in 1993 have led to a twenty-fold increase in applications for leniency. 
Arlman suggests that there are three objectives behind a leniency policy: 1) the incentive for 
cartelists to report their transgressions (arising from a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario) 2) 
deterrence of cartel conduct by increasing the risks involved in collusive offending and 3) 
reduction of costs involved with detection and investigation –much time and effort is saved 
when one cartelist turns in his/her co-offenders in return for reduced penalties or immunity 
from prosecution.261 Arlman also described the EU’s leniency programme, as of 2005, as only 
“moderately” successful in contrast to the US version in which both criminal penalties and 
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private suits (with treble damages) were available, and recommended that the European 
Commission consider criminalising cartel conduct. 262 
Hammond also argues that  “ The first prerequisite to creating an effective amnesty program 
is the threat of severe sanctions for those who lose the race to amnesty.”263 While he 
concedes that it is possible to have an effective amnesty programme, without criminal 
penalties he qualified that statement by also stating that a jurisdiction which relied on fines 
alone must impose severely punitive pecuniary penalties in order to attract amnesty 
applicants.  Furthermore, he suggests that jurisdictions without individual liability and 
criminal penalties will never be as effective at securing amnesty applications as one that 
includes such measures. 264 
The Commerce Commission, who introduced a leniency programme in 2004, receive 
approximately two leniency applications per year and suggest that  overall leniency has assisted 
with the detection of cartels. 265  Applications for immunity from prosecution under s 82D are 
outlined in the Guidelines on Immunity from Prosecution for Cartel Offences. 266  The 
implication is that since leniency programmes are working now, at least to some degree, they 
would work even better if the potential penalties for cartel conduct included imprisonment – 
much like the US approach.  
 
H.  Alternatives to Criminalisation 
While criminalisation is the solution that the government is currently pursuing, it is not the 
only one that has been raised.  The RIS identified two other options, which could be adopted 
instead of criminalisation (the third option).267  These too required significant legislative 
amendment.   Option one involved maintaining the status quo, while improving international 
cooperation via a new framework for negotiating bilateral cooperation agreements.268  This 
option would also see the possibility for private prosecutions, by the provision of class action 
suits for private litigants.   Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen any time soon, as a draft 
Class Action Bill has been before the Secretary for Justice since 2009, without further 
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movement. 269  Wils also suggests that while private enforcement might be an alternative to 
criminalisation, damages suffer the same problem as fines, in terms of deterrence – that unless 
they are nearly 150 per cent of turnover they will be ineffective as a deterrent, and that the 
actual loss is borne by relatively innocent shareholders and employees as well as cartelists.270 
The RIS identified that additional funding for the Commerce Commission would enhance its 
ability to take a more proactive approach to detecting and prosecuting cartels.271  Part of such 
funding could be used to reward confidential informants who provide valuable information in 
the detection of cartels.272  Of course, given the nature of cartels, and the small size of New 
Zealand it is questionable how many such informants would actually be found. 
The RIS’ second option involved improving the current civil regime. 273  This option centred 
on improving certainty around the prohibition against cartels and would create a clearance 
scheme to allow businesses to avoid falling afoul of the law. These changes appear in the Bill, 
in the amendments to ss 30, 31 and 65.274 This option also suggested an update to the penalty 
regime including increased penalties for individuals, which have not been reviewed since 
1990. 275  However, the RIS simultaneously identified the unlikelihood of any significant 
benefits arising from such a change – citing the difficulty posed by imposing optimal fines, as 
mentioned above.   Also, despite increased fines to individuals, cartels would still be able to 
indemnify defendants.  Finally, neither of these changes would enhance New Zealand’s ability 
to request assistance or participate in international anti-cartel cooperation efforts. 
Another possible alternative, suggested by Wils, is  Director disqualification.  This has been 
implemented in the UK where a court can order a director or de facto director be removed from 
a management role for up to 15 years. 276    Wils suggests this is a reasonable “second-best” 
alternative to criminalisation, owing to the stigma and moral condemnation that are associated 
with it.277 He also suggests that being prohibited from holding management roles may punish 
                                                          
269  Liesle Theron   “Class action litigation: a new frontier” Law Talk  (issue 840).          
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271 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80,  at 43(a). 
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273 At 46. 
274 Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill  341-2 cl 7, 12.  
275 Ministry of Economic Development Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 80, at 55-57.  
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an offender in a way for which a firm cannot fully compensate.278    Disqualification also 
appears to at least partially address Libman’s observation, discussed above, regarding a 
convicted regulatory offender’s ability to return immediately to the regulated activity despite 
their transgression. 279 
Perhaps some form of specific or general disqualification is a more appropriate penalty than a 
prison sentence, as it removes the offender from the regulated activity, without a complete 
deprivation of their liberty.  In New Zealand, the penalty could take the form of a restraint, 
which prevents the transgressor from engaging in the activity, similar to that found in s 80C of 
the Act which already provides for up to 5 years’ disqualification for breaches of s 30. 
However disqualification is not a perfect solution.  Firms could still at least partially indemnify 
disqualified executives and resources would have to be expended to police convicted 
offenders.280  Also, despite its merits, disqualification does seem somewhat of a halfway-house 
approach.   Why not aim for maximum deterrent effect?  For, if objective is deterrence and the 
purported success of the US approach is accepted, then a little criminalisation appears to go a 
long way.  Also, while it is a purely subjective standard, the moral condemnation of being 
disqualified as an executive does not damage a reputation in the same way that a prison 
sentence will.    Furthermore, policing a disqualification regime would appear to be prima facie 
time and resource consuming, and of questionable efficacy. Incarceration is also resource 
consuming, but it would be arguably easier to make sure that the prisoner is performing the 
requirements of their sentence – at least while in custody.  
As a final alternative I suggest that instead of changing the penalties imposed, why not change 
the process by which cartel offences are prosecuted to increase the certainty of punishment?    
From a regulatory perspective, rather than switching to a new regulatory tool, there may be 
gains to be made simply from improving the efficacy of the tool that is already in use. This 
approach relies on cartelists being rational actors or at least capable of cost-benefit 
calculation.281   Deterrence theory suggests that an unpalatable punishment has a limited 
deterrent effect as many potential offenders do not believe that they will be caught – and given 
the difficulty in detecting cartels our potential cartelists are correct.282 However, what is more 
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likely to be deter (although this too is limited) is the certainty of apprehension and punishment, 
rather than the punishment itself.283 
To that end perhaps offences against Part 2 of the Commerce Act could be removed from the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. Instead they could be tried before a tribunal, composed of a judge 
and several experts, or a single specialist judge?   In the same way that the Employment 
Relations Authority (the “ERA”) streamlines the way in which employment disputes are 
resolved, a Commerce tribunal could deal with a higher volume of Commerce Act 
infringements, including cartels owing to its less stringent rules (e.g. The ERA does not have 
the same rules of evidence as the courts) and the expertise of its adjudicators.  
At the same time fine levels could be adjusted, by being imposed according to statutorily 
defined minimum levels. The current Act provides for a penalty which must not exceed three 
times the gains made from the cartel conduct, or 10 % of turnover. 284 If this became a 
mandatory minimum i.e.  “penalties of at least three times the gain or 10% of turnover” in 
combination with the streamlined process, it would arguable have greater deterrent effect than 
the current level of fines. 
These fines could also be applied to individuals - which should address concerns that 
imprisonment is too severe a sanction.  Furthermore, natural justice fears could be further 
allayed by guaranteeing a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.    As part of this reform the 
Bill’s proposed changes, in terms of defining and clarifying cartel conduct, as well as the 
changes to the  should be retained. 
This idea is not without its drawbacks. There would be significant costs involved with setting 
up such a body.  However, the more efficient proceeding would lead to less prolonged, and 
thereby less costly hearings.   The imposition of crippling pecuniary penalties against  
individuals  would encounter the same problems with indemnification by the body corporate, 
but the statutory minimum fine would circumvent issues of judicial reluctance. 
Furthermore, with a less stringent process conduct which was not previously considered to be 
cartel, might be captured. This would result in more type one errors, and the imprisonment of 
innocent parties.   Such arguments are not convincing for two reasons.  First, if the cartel 
definition provisions, in s 30A and related sections, are still enacted then this adds substantial 
clarification to the law, which then reduces the chance of non-hard core cartel conduct being 
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caught.  Second, the authorisation and clearance regimes create opportunities for 
businesspeople who are concerned about breaking the law to manage their risks.  While this 
does create a compliance cost, such an expense may be minimal if the reforms enhance the 
transparency of the law, regarding which kinds of conduct will be captured. 
Finally, a tribunal would not address the problems of international cooperation, or allow the 
Commission access to MACMA or the Extradition Act – unless these too were amended. 
However, such a quasi-judicial body might actually have some domestic deterrent effect if its 
efficiency demonstrably increased the swiftness and likelihood of punishment. 
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
In the introduction to this paper I suggested that I would be able to draw conclusions on two 
matters:  criminalisation as a regulatory response and the Bill’s desirability, as a response to 
cartels. 
Firstly, in terms of criminalisation as a regulatory response I have come to the conclusion that 
it is merely one regulatory approach.  While it has some distinctive procedural features and 
consequences for transgressors criminal law fits neatly under the regulatory paradigm. This is 
because it exists for the same purpose as other areas of law, the control of conduct.  In this 
context the criminal law is being applied to regulate the conduct of “well dressed thieves” and 
deter them from forming cartels. 
While it has the distinction of being associated strongly with deprivation of liberty, and serious 
offending, criminal law is simply a form of command.  Thus criminalisation, the decision to 
make particular conduct criminal, still keeps the conduct within the broad sphere of regulation, 
but takes a particular regulatory approach to dealing with it.  Looking specifically at the cartel 
context, criminalisation still has the same comprehensive regulatory goal as the existing 
regime: the preservation of the market’s allocative efficiency by preventing the market failure 
that results from cartels.  Neither the current regime, nor the goal itself are fundamentally 
altered by the addition of criminal penalties.  The real question is whether the regime’s overall 
effectiveness will be enhanced by the change. 
This leads to my second conclusion, the overall desirability of the criminalisation of cartels.   
In terms of meeting the regulatory sub-goals, deterrence detection and harmonisation, 
criminalisation has some merits.  While its actual deterrent effect is unclear the US experience 
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suggests that detection of cartels will be enhanced by criminalisation.  In terms of 
harmonisation with overseas jurisdictions, while the likely success of information-sharing is 
speculative criminalisation will overcome certain jurisdictional investigative impediments by 
allowing access to MACMA and extradition regimes. 
Overall, it appears as though criminalisation will at least make some progress towards the 
overall goal although that progress will come at a cost – for both the regulator and commercial 
actors.  While that cost may be significant I believe that, in the absence of actual evidence to 
the contrary,  it is justified. 
While cost is a factor that may weigh against criminalisation, there is at least a partial answer 
to cost concerns in that cartel conduct is a violation of moral norms. 285  Imprisoning cartelists, 
as Wils argues, sends a moral message. 286   Similarly, our society does not criminalise murder 
on the basis of a cost-benefit ratio.  This is fortunate, as the investigation, trial and punishment 
of murder requires the expenditure of enormous resources, with no financial return.  Rather, 
we criminalise murder because as a society we regulate anti-social conduct, and perceived 
violations of moral norms.   In the same way price fixing, while not as directly harmful as 
murder, can clearly be conceptualized as a crime that harms the public good of free 
competition. In that sense its harmfulness and moral deviancy are deserving of a strong 
regulatory response, which criminalisation will hopefully provide. 
Finally, above I suggested that the true topic of this paper was whether the intersection of 
criminal law and competition law (under the regulatory paradigm) was complimentary or 
intrusive.   To answer this, I submit that if price fixing can be accurately conceptualized as a 
crime, then criminal law seems to be the appropriate regulatory approach for dealing with it. 
In that sense the intersection is indeed complimentary, and thus desirable. 
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